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on a theory of communication that aims to intensify the life of the international community and relies on the collective treaty that legalizes that community and establishes its institutional framework. Prior to the outbreak of World War I Schück-ing produced a groundbreaking legal treatise on the Peace Conferences in The Hague as the first world confederation of nations. 5 All of these traditions are interrelated, and occasionally point to one another, either approvingly or disapprovingly. They also share important elements. Each endorses the politics of liberal democracy and takes the view that the key to political peace is the presence of a democratic system in each of the members of the international community. 6 Further, they all assume a pax mercatoria of the type that emphasizes the value of economic interdependence or economic communication and Weltwirtschaft. This view involves the privatization of international disputes. 7 Although they do not always consider it necessary to theorize on the basis of the presupposition of the pax mercatoria, pacifists usually think pragmatically, transforming economics into a legal methodology, as is also true in the case of Schücking. Ahead of his time on this issue, as he was on many others, he proposed, as early as 1918, the creation of an international agency with jurisdiction over natural resources to balance the opposing interests of individual states. 8 Finally, to a greater or lesser degree these pacifist traditions share awareness of the need to change the world and of the fact that one cannot make an omelette without breaking a few eggs. In other words, political change on a grand scale was desired and one must bear the use of violence that it would entail. Thus, as Habermas mentions, the democratic states obeying the rule of law that arose from the French and American Revolutions were, while Kant was writing on a peaceful world-league of republics, 'the exception and not the rule'. 9 Similarly, Kelsen The American pacifist Salmon Levinson argued that international disputes and individual disputes were essentially dealing with the same questions of property or property rights and liberty: '[t]ake the case of Alsace-Lorraine: After all, through the centuries, it was a controversy over real estate; a large amount of real estate to be sure, and involving, incidentally, a question of national allegiances; but hence the disappearance, of the historical empires then still in existence and, most importantly, aimed to prevent the appearance of new ones on either side of the Atlantic. Not a very different fate for autocratic governments was implied in Schück-ing's conception of the organization of the world on the basis of the sentiment of brotherhood traced back to the French Revolution. This approach probably explains why Stolleis describes Schücking's general political tendency as bürgerlichen Pazifismus. 10 In this regard, looking beyond the rhetoric, one might argue that these pacifist traditions of international law were not in principle anti-militaristic -one needs only to have a look at the conventions adopted in the Peace conferences in The Hague. 11 Generally, in earlier perpetual peace projects, such as those of the Abbé de Saint Pierre, John Bellers, or William Penn, the use of force had been always a latent possibility, if, perhaps, one that was more candidly articulated. Indeed, one finds the requirement of a total war in order to achieve perpetual peace within some of the oldest written peace projects. 12 Those ancient authors were being revisited at the beginning of the 20th century and studied seriously by researchers of pacifism with a determined emphasis on their expressions in favour of peace. The refusal by pacifists to take notice of their comments on the use of force gave sceptics a golden opportunity for irony: 'But perhaps the encomium that would interest us most', one concluded after discussing the use of force in the text of a medieval pacifist, 'is that he was an "initiator" of the pacifist movement'. 13 The traditions of international law described above provide evidence that the cause of peace had become an integral part of the main political projects thriving at the beginning of the 20th century. Despite the numerous critiques of their practical results, the two Peace Conferences in The Hague (1899/1907) must be recognized today as great achievements in law, 14 which contributed towards transforming pacifism into a respectable political doctrine in the international sphere. The first delegate of the United States to the Second Hague Peace Conference, Joseph H. Choate, expressed this change of attitudes in 1913 when he affirmed with pride that pacifism had come in vogue among public men, since not many years ago the Peace movement and its advocates 'were more frequently the object of ridicule than of any serious consideration'. 15 It should be stressed that the approaches outlined in this article are exhaustive neither of the pacifist traditions in play in the history of international law, nor of 10 Also that of his life-long friend and intellectual companion Hans Wehberg (1885-1962): M. Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland, Dritter Band 1914 -1945 (1999 , at 58; see also W. Schücking and H. Wehberg, Die Satzung des Völkerbundes (1924) , at 2.
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For a good summary of the conventions see Brown Scott, 'The Work of the Second Hague Peace Conference', 2 AJIL (1908) 1.
those which could possibly be imagined. The latter are as inexhaustible as human creativity. But those four methods of promoting peace by legal means were important during Walther Schücking's lifetime and keep cropping up in a study of his pacifism as alternative visions of world peace, despite their marked similarity to each other. It is worth highlighting that, taken together, they constitute the bulk of twentieth century international law. To that extent it might be suggested that international law in the last century has the distinguishing feature of pacifism at the service of 'the solidarity of interests'. 16 Considering these different methods of promoting peace together also helps highlight the scope of Schücking's intellectual effort. He undoubtedly made an important contribution to the consolidation of modern international law as we know it today. Before exploring these traditions in terms of their interaction with Schücking's, we shall first give some thought to what was arguably his dual (and troubled) professional commitment: as both a political pacifist and an internationalist scholar.
The Pacifist International Lawyer
Schücking was one of the first professional international lawyers, as the profession was understood during the 20th century. A learned scholar, an internationally active pacifist, and the first German judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) -these are his credentials. And still, he was not simply those things. At times, researching the life and works of Walther Schücking is a source of anxiety. 17 Controversy and polemic were often his life companions. Schücking also often displayed a steadfast refusal to admit the complexity of the political world, 'including his own position', 18 which was in truth often the most intricate and bold of all. The historical context in which Schücking was politically active as a pacifist -Germany from 16 Schücking, 'Kultur und Internationalismus' in Der Bund der Völker. Studien und Vorträge zum organisatorischen Pazifismus (1918) (Mar 1910) 35, at 48; '[t]he fact that we have entered a new age of world economy, in which finally the solidarity of interests will prevail over all national differences and that the political organisation of the Kulturwelt has to adapt to the facts of the economic life -the fact that the beginnings of that organisation have been produced already in The Hague, cannot be concealed perpetually from the liberal (bürgerlichen) circles'. Schücking, Neue Ziele, supra note 6, at 100. Villalpando has recently defined 'solidarity' among states in the context of community interests as 'as much an objective state of affairs (a material interdependence between individuals to achieve a certain goal) as a subjective state of mind (the awareness of the existence of such interdependence, and willingness to protect it as such)'. Nevertheless Villalpando uses the concept of solidarity in the deeper framework of the 'social intercourse of states': Villalpando, 'The Legal Dimension of the International Community: How Community Interests are Protected in International Law', 21 EJIL (2010) 387, at 396, 418. On his part Schücking's theory was still at a rudimentary stage and he referred generally only to economic interests on the one hand and peace on the other. The former would bring the latter into a kind of evolutionary process. But he was not yet able to theorize the notion of peace in itself as a value or an interest belonging to the community. However, his foresight is remarkable.
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For a good introduction to his life that captures this feeling see D. Acker, Walther Schücking (1875 Schücking ( -1935 19 By the turn of the century there was a general feeling of public marginality within the German pacifist movement, which, in the words of Bismarck, was perceived to have a 'communist distinctiveness '. 20 It is also important to note that the intensity of Schücking's career as a pacifist coincides with the sinuous path of Germany towards, within, and away from World War I, and finally to the seizure of power by the Nazis. Germany and Schücking appear as in a 'counter-striving disposition' (gegenstrebige Fügung) that resembles Walter Benjamin's angel of history. 21 Benjamin depicts the angel of history driven into the future by the storm of progress to which his back is turned, while he, with his face to the past seeks to piece together that which has been smashed by what he perceives as a single catastrophe. Schücking's idealism was not shattered by the war. However, like the angel of progress, whom he had embraced, he recognized the catastrophe -perceived naturally as something personal -in two events: the injustice of the Peace Treaty of Versailles and Hitler's legal revolution of 1933.
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Furthermore, World War I and the tensions that arose in the post-Versailles period forcefully signified trouble for a pacifist-minded international lawyer; in particular for one who defended peace though international organization. While Schücking believed that international organization in general and the League of Nations in particular would be the most pressing international issues, the political spectrum in Germany from left to right was disinclined to support that organization that was considered an 'alliance of victors'. 23 The controversy aroused by Schücking's active pacifism may well be attributable to his difficult exercise of a dual profession. Schücking's active life evolved and developed along with the invention of the modern profession of 'international lawyer'. In this process he characteristically adopted a standpoint that went further than contemporary political, social, or general conditions would allow. This approach tended to result in friction, but also helped drive matters continuously forward -without a doubt he was one who saw everything in the large, as the Baltic German Martens put it once. 24 With his work as an international lawyer Schücking contributed to the inauguration of some of the now established bipolarities of the modern discipline, such as those between law and politics, 25 law and economics, 26 and cosmopolitanism and (neo)colonialism. 27 The embedded complexity of those ambivalences is simultaneously reflected in the international legal order. In this respect Schücking's work and theories can be located within mainstream international law. Schücking stood at the outset for 'total codification', which caused some consternation in the rest of the committee, which decided later on a 'partial codification'. The episode is described in Bodendiek supra note 8, at 258.
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In his classical article on the politics of international law Koskenniemi argues that 19th and 20th century jurists sought a secure foothold in respect of the interpretation of texts, facts, and history in logic, science, and so on in order to contain subjectivism. But they did not find that basis. Instead, their subjectivism re-emerges by transforming those texts, facts, and history into arenas of political struggle: Koskenniemi, 'The Politics of International Law', 1 EJIL (1990) 4; also by Koskenniemi: Schücking's 'career highlighted the genuine ambivalence of a legal politics': Koskenniemi, supra note 17, at 216. 26 The emergence of international economic law as a discipline may be taken as an (impossible) attempt to undo this bipolarity of law and economics. But his extremely demanding and complex double commitment to the active life of a pacifist politician and to the contemplative life of an internationalist scholar was a turn of the screw and quite unique. Moreover, he occasionally failed to respect the borders of those two fields, acting as a politician when the scholar was expected and vice versa. Due to this, mistrust or misunderstanding sometimes arose.
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His appointment as judge of the PCIJ was well received by public opinion within and outside Germany. 30 It can be viewed as the turning-point in his life, in which he could unite the two parts of his dual vocation into one. Evidence of this is that following his appointment as a judge in The Hague he relinquished all his numerous political commitments, even though not all of them were incompatible with his new position. His new activity provided him with the opportunity to work actively in support of internationalism. After all, this was his political project. At the PCIJ Schücking's activity as a lawyer was at last his practical instrument as a politician. 31 To that extent Schücking is one of the heroes of the pacifist traditions of international law.
Die Organisation der Welt: Project and Reality
Schücking's pacifist project for a world organization lost impetus with the formation of the League of Nations. 32 Occasional remarks in his commentary on the statute of that organization show that he did not change the basic propositions of his own project after the war, but ostensibly he was no longer in a position to defend them with 29 For his failed political efforts to secure a position in the law faculty of Berlin in order to teach international law in 'a new spirit', with seminars on 'scientific pacifism' and the 'history and theory of the peace movements', see the story in detail in A. Klopsch Except by the right-wing radicals who were aggrieved by the election of 'the Jew and pacifist Schücking': Acker, supra note 17, at 203. Schücking was, however, not Jewish.
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He himself spoke (probably rightly) of the 'as is generally known always unworldly jurists (weltfremde Juristen)': Schücking, supra note 23, at 15.
32
Whether Schücking's project gained at the same time a concrete foothold in real life with the formation of the League is irrelevant to the topic discussed in the following pages: his own pacifist project. At any rate, the whole historical trajectory of the League, starting with the ban on entering imposed on Germany, is completely alien to Schücking's ideals. the vigour he had previously shown. 33 We shall next therefore review his personal pacifist journey, especially during that period in which he expressed his own ideas on the topic without reference to the League.
The value of Schücking's legal-historical work on pacifist themes has today crossed the borders of disciplines. Together with a couple of other authors he is credited with having inaugurated peace history, opening up 'a terrain of historical enquiry that had been almost entirely neglected', in comparison, for instance, with the innumerable earlier writings on the history of war. 34 Remarkably, Schücking's text, Die Organisation der Welt of 1908 is by some distance the earliest of the works considered groundbreaking in this field. 35 The next of these, the famous Der Gedanke der internationalen Organisation by Jacob Ter Meulen, appeared almost ten years later.
36 In Schücking's case the choice of the historical approach was more of a choice of method than a mere inclination towards history, although, as his previous scholarly work (and his Habilitation) showed, he could do that too. 37 But Die Organisation der Welt was his most programmatic book, in which he wanted to combine a description of the past with his idea of the future. 38 In order to understand Walther Schücking's idea of pacifism, it is necessary to analyse the method he used to predict the future through the observation of present conditions. He acted as a visionary of progress, and this activity kept him constantly in motion: peace, it seemed to him, was always capable of future improvement. This improvement evidently implied that in the future the conditions of peace would be more favourable to his political sensibilities.
Like the arbitration movement for settlement of international disputes Schücking valued and recognized the work of pacifist movements from outside international law, such as the Quakers. The famous pacifist Alfred Fried had a great and often acknowledged influence on him.
39 Occasionally Schücking would criticize the pacifists for not being radical enough in promoting the cause of internationalism. 40 His particular 33 Thus, on the one hand he admits that in The Hague, before the war, the states had not yet understood the potential for international collaboration, and on the other he reports the petition to the Council of the League by the commission of jurists to recover the work done in the Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907 and to organize the third peace conference as soon as circumstances allowed it: Schücking and Wehberg, supra note 10, at 3, 567. The author of this article has used the Leipzig edition of 1909. understanding of pacifism also served as a catalyst for progressive further development of international law. Nevertheless, as a scientist he considered himself an international lawyer.
The first four chapters of Die Organisation der Welt form a piece of great scholarly work. Starting with ancient Greece, they provide a smooth review of projects for the international organization of both Europe and the world in which he shows a preference for the project of the Abbé de Saint Pierre. Schücking intimates his conviction that international law is pacifism, and not simply an agent for peace. Further, international law can be equated with the international organization of the world. While in earlier times the aim of peace had been defended through empire -such as Dante's proposal for a world monarchy -and also, in swift succession, through a series of different political forms, a period of general disorganization ensued after the failure of the universal empire. Schücking rejected both the previous empires and the world anarchy that followed. Instead he considered that the time was ripe for the establishment of a cosmopolitan world organization. The candour and optimism of the text renders it disarming at moments, since its reliance on reason provides a contrast to other more sceptical contemporary authors dealing with the same questions.
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In the light of Schücking's earlier writings, which lacked this clear vision, one might suggest that in the period in which he wrote Die Organisation der Welt his intellectual aspirations were changing. When the topic 'peace' appears in previous texts it is handled in such a way as to represent a tougher line of international law -an attitude which, it should be noted, was probably due to his genetic boldness. Thus as an expert on the law of the sea, he had had no problem in defending the notion that a sea blockade was an institution of the law of peace when discussing the actions of the German imperial government during its conflict with Venezuela. However, the government had pronounced such blockades to be a measure of war. 42 In this conflict Germany was reacting to the confiscation of German goods and to Venezuela's subsequent refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to decide over the conflict. Against the view of the experts of the Institut de droit international and the doctrine of Calvo, Schücking also affirmed that in the so-called peace blockade good law dictated that neutral ships should not be allowed to pass.
'It is the characteristic feature of Natural law that one had nerve enough to use the own reason and establish a rational yardstick to things.' This seems ultimately his own way of seeing things: Schück-ing, supra note 33, at 52. Kelsen The motive was evident: '[o]nly in that way could be brought about the menace of starvation that has moved finally Venezuela to surrender'. 43 The reasoning behind Schücking's defence of blockades as an institution of peace was that they avoided the next step of war. Arguably, Schücking was not merely taking a semantic positionthat it was a peaceful measure -in a dispute which diplomats and politicians (who, considered as a professional body, are usually slow to use such sensitive words 44 ) had qualified as war. It may be the case that he was pushing the concept of peace to the limits of its possibilities. Some years were still needed in order to achieve the complete elimination of war in its technical sense. 45 But one should not completely dismiss Schücking's view that the 'peaceful life' was to be attained through international organization, especially if we put it in its historical context. The conclusion of the Hague Peace Conferences had been regarded as a success, at least in terms of the participation of powers and of the role played by public opinion; and the future direction of modern international law of the 20th century, at the time at which he was writing, was still uncertain. Thus, Villalpando explains that, as at the beginning of the 20th century, international law contained few norms not directly related to 'the preservation of each state's personal interests on its own territory', or, in other words, 'of its sovereign rights'. 46 Villalpando supra note 16, at 390. On the other hand, one might think that if international law per se was peace, then by its very existence international law nourished a teleology; that is to say, peaceand no other purposes needed to be superimposed on it. This was, however, not the case. In the last chapter of Die Organisation der Welt, and in many other writings too, Schücking lays down the principles of a political project of economic internationalism. While the idea of sovereignty had historically provided a useful means of liberating nations from the yoke of the universal empire and Church, now, Schücking asserted, sovereignty obstructed the development of international law. He concluded that 'the sovereignty of the states in international law is nothing else than the unlimited capacity to contract in the field of private law'. 48 In the manner of a true cosmopolitan, Schücking thought globally about how to transform the world through a matrix of private law contracts. Very probably the globalization of today is the internationalization of yesterday of authors like Schücking. 49 Thus, it was natural for him to claim that modern pacifism had the merit of reducing the role of political sovereignty as the instrument of economic exploitation of territories. 50 That was a new type of pacifist neo-colonialism. Although it did not signify a change in the centrality of the economic argument in his theoretical system, there is no doubt that the war diminished his enthusiasm in this respect. It was also due to his view of economic internationalism that, characteristically, Schücking placed Pufendorf's basic norm, 'You are not alone in the world', in the terrain of the economic interdependence of his days, exclusively in terms of economic significance. In this manner he deprived it of its original ethical or social import. 51 Further, Schücking the politician surprises the reader by suddenly transforming the text of Die Organisation der Welt, in its final chapter, into a political pamphlet. As such it contains an attack against the Imperial government couched in the language of combative journalism. In that regard, one can readily appreciate why some of his academic colleagues were alienated by his style of argument, which occasionally appeared somewhat too temperamental. 52 One might suggest that he was acting then as a politician-scholar overstepping the limits of academic writing.
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Koskenniemi's argument is that modern international law was born 'at the meetings of the Institut de droit international and the pages of the Revue de droit international et de législation comparée from 1869 onwards': supra note 17, at 4 and generally. 48 Schücking, supra note 33, at 78. 49 See otherwise Bodendiek's general assessment of Schücking's oeuvre, in which he distinguishes between globalization and internationalization and firmly categorizes his work under the second: Bodendiek, supra note 8, at 311. See what Schücking had to say about economic globalisation: '[a]lready have been established specialised chairs for "international polity" in Cambridge, London and Montreal whose holder's exclusive task is to study the world economy and the political postulates that might be derived from it for international law': Schücking, Neue Ziele, supra note 6, at 101. Schücking has sometimes been called an outsider, 53 and there is no doubt that the manner of expression in many of his writings bore a greater resemblance to someone like Jeremy Bentham as an essayist in 'A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace' than anything one might find among German academics of the period. 54 And, as the saying goes, 'the style is the man'. Genuine incisiveness at the service of pacifist utilitarian ideology is common to both.
As a pacifist and internationalist Schücking was critical of Germany's un-collaborative attitude towards obligatory arbitration and disarmament at both the 1899 and the 1907 Hague Conferences. At the outset militarism seems to be the enemy. However, in those days both democracies and empires alike were militarist. Consequently, it might be more accurate to say that during this period Schücking focused on attacking the type of militaristic autocracy represented by Prussia. 55 Nevertheless, from the beginning of his career as a pacifist until the end of his life he remained a convinced anti-militarist.
But rather than anti-militarism per se, probably the major problem for pacifism and the pacifist traditions of international law generally is to produce a credible defence of the argument that there is always a legal solution to be applied before resorting to war. The assumption that war is not in principle a legitimate instrument of politics was a novelty at the beginning of the 20th century. Schücking used to compare the disappearance of inter-state war with that of civil war. On the one hand it had been extensively suppressed through inner Rechtsfrieden; on the other, it still existed as a possibility that was 'all too dangerous'. 56 Pacifists like Schücking helped shape the 20th century approach to international politics in this respect. Although neither they nor anyone else managed to prevent the wars of the previous century, they contributed to the re-establishment of war as a legal institution integrated into the international legal system and, to put it cautiously, helped achieve a certain degree of centralized control over it. Despite the fact that Schücking wrote that 'the main thing is that war gradually ceases to be a legal institution', 57 neither he nor the other pacifist traditions completely eliminated it in their theories. 58 It reappeared in a different form, usually as an international sanction or as a means of enforcing international law. The maxim of 'peace through law' goes, structurally, hand in hand with the maxim of 'war through law'.
One pitfall of Schücking's discourse is his tendency to generalization. This may be necessary at a political meeting or in a pamphlet, but not in academic texts. Explicitly so in Schücking, supra note 5, at 316. 56 Schücking, supra note 27, at 33.
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He continues, 'This is a hard blow for the militarists': Schücking, supra note 33, at 83. Nevertheless, while it is evident that Schücking wanted to urge his fellow countrymen to become more actively involved in the development of the institutions of peacewhich explains the use of propaganda-style techniques -and also bearing in mind that the German government had at first reacted against the idea of a treaty of universal arbitration and the British plan for a PCA, the issue was far more complex than Schücking allows. 59 The question addressed below is how he contrasted German and American politicians in his views on internationalism and pacifism. He regarded the former as reactionary, and the latter as the image of progress.
60
The embarrassment caused to Schücking by his country's attitude may be compared with the arguments presented by Philipp Zorn, the German delegate at the first Peace Conference at The Hague. Zorn opined that arbitral practice remained at an experimental stage, and therefore to proceed in an important matter like that without sufficient experience 'might lead to discord rather than to harmony'. 61 This argument resembles the prudent maxim that Lassa Oppenheim applied to progress in international law: festina lente (make haste slowly). 62 At the same time, the proceedings of the 1899 conference plainly show that Germany and Austria were reluctant to commit themselves to binding arbitration. They forcefully resisted the idea of other powers having a 'duty' to remind a state involved in a dispute of the necessity of arbitration. A joint effort of the most excellent French and Italian diplomacy was needed in The Hague to turn the 'moral duty' mentioned in draft Article 27 of the convention on arbitration, proposed by Germany and supported by the United States, into 'duty'. 63 The point is important in the context of Schücking's view that the conference in The Hague had produced a confederation or a league of nations. He viewed Article 27 as crucial in connecting the authority of the powers with the arbitration process. The process was voluntary and the arbitral board only had jurisdiction when both parties appealed to it. From this basis arose the importance of Article 27. For Schück-ing that Article was crucial to flesh out the organization 'created' in The Hague. It was Article 27 of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes which showed that the convention was more than a multilateral treaty of arbitration, and that behind it existed an entity formed by the signatory powers. 64 Indeed, the United States was equally indecisive on the question of binding arbitration, and displayed both enthusiasm and, at the same time, an unwillingness to commit fully. Consequently, at both conferences, when the time came to adopt the convention on arbitration, it made a declaration recalling the Monroe doctrine. 66 In other words, the United States and Germany vacillated between the desire to foster the cause of peace through arbitration and the effort to preserve their right of isolation; one of the prohibited words in Walther Schücking's new legal vocabulary of peace. Despite that, Schücking only criticized the 'sad attitude of our (German) Imperial government'.
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In his younger years, therefore, Schücking tended to feel that, where internationalism was concerned, the grass was greener on the other side. This position may be challenged in retrospect, but his perception helps to show what style of international law and diplomacy he preferred.
Historical developments, especially in respect of international organizations, influenced his change of opinion in this matter, and he became, as it were, a little less internationalist. Otto Gessler (1875-1955) who, among other public positions, held the office of Minister of Defence during the period of the Weimar Republic, recalled that when Schücking became a judge at the PCIJ he learned that there, together with law, politics also played a role, 'and not a small one'. 68 However, one might suggest that by the time he arrived in The Hague Schücking was already a heavyweight in the matter of politics. High politics had played the leading role during the period of his struggle to bring forward during World War I the future idea of international organization starting from the work done at the Peace Conferences. He described his instruction in politics as having been previously mistaken, when he and the pacifists had divided the world into imperialists and pacifists. Alas, he later learned that there were, unfortunately, pacifists who were at the same time imperialists: '[t]hus, it seems to me that America under all circumstances wishes to be the state that gives the peace to the world'. Understandably, especially after the outbreak of World War I, politicians and lawyers in many countries, including those who previously had not been much attracted by the idea, began drafting proposals for an international organization. 70 We have the example of Lassa Oppenheim, who was decisively opposed to a world federation or even a European federation, which he considered utopian. In his study of the future of international law he highlighted the importance of the foundational aspect of the Peace Conferences for internationalism, but he did not consider it feasible to develop from them an organization with any authority over the sovereignty of states. 71 The shock of the war, however, induced him to side even with the cause of pacifism. Although he rejected the unrealistic aspect of pacifism ('for these reasons I cannot call myself an orthodox pacifist, and cannot work with the ordinary everyday pacifists') he concluded, 'I nevertheless call myself a pacifist'. 72 Shortly before his death he also drafted a design for a League. In the context of this general awareness that something 'had to be done', and given the active contribution from every part of the world towards international organization, it was the plan of President Wilson for the League and his decision in pursuing it which caused Schücking trouble from the beginning. 73 This was not only because Wilson's plan did not closely follow the work done in The Hague, which was Schücking's main conception for a future international organization. It also aimed to create anew a worldwide international organization, with all the consequences such a project would entail. While Wilson's plan was alienated from The Hague project by the burden of failure that latter project obviously carried, such a novelty in the issue of the league -as Schücking and the German pacifists viewed it -was fated to contribute to the much-feared 'alliance of victors'.
Ultimately the alertness of Schücking's political instinct again proved, intriguingly, to be ahead of the times. In a critique of the project of the League of Nations he drafted in Paris, Schücking expressed his criticism of the anti-democratic nature of the League. He regarded the Council of the League as an 'aristocratic regime' of the world (incidentally one in which Germany had no part), and saw it as an offshoot of the 'imperialistic tendencies of the great powers'. Schücking also appraised the draft negatively owing to what he considered the legal novelty of a political right of intervention. Acker, supra note 17, at 88-89. 74 Schücking, supra note 23, at 7, 9, 14. 
Peace through Arbitration and Adjudication
The projects for a League of Nations put forward by the United States and Great Britain did provide for obligatory recourse to arbitration. 75 However, the pacifist tradition promoting arbitration and the judicial settlement of international disputes did not as a rule embrace the concept of an international organization, and was rather inclined against the promotion of a world federation.
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Regarding the question of dispute settlement Schücking agreed that international arbitration and adjudication was an essential part of the pacifist project, and this circumstance created an affinity between him and the American pacifists, in particular with James Brown Scott. 77 But the German never quite considered that arbitration and international adjudication would be enough to secure peace. Brown Scott, on the other hand, consistently expressed his view that the instrument for international peace was a permanent judicial court among sovereign countries. 78 In Brown Scott's view this had not yet been achieved by the work in The Hague. The Peace Conferences had produced neither a permanent nor a judicial institution (the members of the PCA had no permanent position or salary).
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For those promoting peace through judicial settlement before and after World War I the two main proposals remained the establishment of an international court and the codification of international law. In order to achieve such codification another international conference was needed. This would not be easy. The most pragmatic men of peace, but perhaps less experienced in matters of international law, estimated that 'it may take two years to prepare such a code'.
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The realists pointed to a sociological problem with the project of an international code. The 'too optimistic friends of the peace movement' did not see that the international powers represented very different stages of social advancement. The certainty of international law was from the outset gravely endangered by this fact. For example, if one looked closely at the cases presented by pacifists as settled by arbitration, one would discover that many were in fact adjusted diplomatically. The real number of cases in which legal principles or legal forms had been applied did not give grounds for optimism in this regard. For internationally minded lawyers, on the other hand, 82 the real problem was always that of overriding sovereignty. This was a common conundrum for each of the peace traditions of international law. 83 Specifically in the case of the judicial settlement of disputes, as Elihu Root put it, it was impossible to give an international court unlimited jurisdiction. As a realist-pacifist he knew that the key question was gradually to broaden the scope of the law that such a court would be competent to apply and, in order to achieve that, codification was needed. The role of international courts would increase only when there was sufficient international codification -that is to say, laws to be applied -in place. Through codification, states could retain control over the international courts and judges. 84 In fact, there had been slow but steady progress in the laws on dispute settlement since the beginning of the 20th century. The Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes previously mentioned was the 'crown jewel' of the 1899 Hague conference. 85 The intellectual impetus behind the PCA came from the British in the person of their delegate, Sir Julian Pancefote, also in the 1899 conference. 86 The fact that during the 1907 conference the plan for a permanent judicial tribunal developed the nucleus of what became the PCIJ after the war attests to the importance of these early projects. 87 But still in 1907 the powers had not been able to agree on the precise method of appointing the judges of a court of justice.
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For the key role of the 'international mind' see Root, supra note 68. 83 Schücking and Kelsen were in favour of attributing true sovereignty to the international organization and the legal order respectively. But this is the question that made their proposal unacceptable for many. Thus Kelsen speaks of the 'solely true sovereignty that is to say, that of the universal international legal order': supra note 4, at 288; Kant and the pacifist tradition promoting arbitration and the judicial settlement of international disputes were on the realist side, recognizing that the true point of contention lay in the question of sovereignty. For this point and a detailed description of the different types of dispute settlement see Crawford and Schrijver, supra note 84, at 160.
On the eve of the second Hague conference, the German professor and peace delegate Zorn recognized Britain's leading role in introducing the arbitration plan and in pursuing the scheme for the PCA. He traced it back to religious and humanitarian sentiments popular with both the English and the American peoples. Despite his critical attitude to what he regarded as an often dismissive attitude towards international law on the part of Britain, on this question he attributed all the progress to that country. 88 For their part, historians referred the principle of arbitration to the early projects of universal peace, such as that of Pierre Du Bois, lawyer and counsellor in the court of Philippe le Bel, in the 13th century. 89 In the modern era, the principle appears in several of the classics of international law. Vattel, for example, considered that the law of nature 'recommends peace', although then he supported arbitration half-heartedly. 90 Schücking found the renaissance of arbitration in modern times in the newlyborn United States, when George Washington requested an arbitration tribunal from the former mother country for the settlement of a boundary dispute with Canada in 1790, which resulted in the Jay Treaty. 91 However, Zorn was right to trace contemporary efforts back to Britain. In his history of the influence of pacifism in the development of international law, Lange attributes the great advancement of the cause of disarmament and arbitration in the 19th century to what he regarded as 'at least an unofficial alliance' of pacifism and free trade. It was Richard Cobden (1804-1865), the British manufacturer, politician, and promoter of the cause of free trade, who had come round to believing the case for that alliance. Thus in 1842 he wrote: 'It has struck me that it would be well to try to engraft our Free Trade agitation upon the Peace movement. They are one and the same cause.' 92 And, pace Lange, no sooner said than done: the first peace congress with this particular inclination to free trade met in London in 1843. Until 1853 several congresses were held, which produced two important results in terms of propaganda for the cause of political peace: the prohibition of war loans and the encouragement of arbitration treaties. As early as 1849, Cobden personally brought a motion before Parliament calling for international arbitration, and he campaigned intensively for the reduction of public expenditure on armaments and non-intervention in European affairs. 93 In this context, it is unsurprising to note that the plan for universal peace put forward by Schücking, supra note 6, at 102; Arbitration and the United States, supra note 86, at 479-484. 92 Lange, supra note 3, at 375; quotation by Cobden at 374. Bentham in 1789 included both free trade and a universal court of judicature to settle differences between the nations. 94 Other accounts of the history of peace through arbitration do not take Lange's utilitarist perspective. They depict the origins of modern arbitration as the result of the success of the Alabama arbitration and of the interaction of pacifism with high politics. 95 Finally, a number of German pacifists, like Eduard Loewenthal, were proud to see the origins of an obligatory international judiciary in their own efforts -in the case of Loewenthal, literally as his own idea. A journalist and writer of the stature of a man of the 18th century, he was the author of books on topics ranging from physics to the codification of international law. Loewenthal was also an active propagandist in the international arena, and as such his activities were taken seriously in important political spheres.
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Earlier proposals for a council and high court of international arbitration, such as that by Cobden's good friend the Italian-born British lawyer Leone Levi (1821-1888), in turn appeared independently of the cause of peace. They drew inspiration from the pragmatic need for commercial tribunals and improved commercial arbitration arrangements.
97
From a more technical perspective, the advancement in the active promotion of arbitration and adjudication on English soil has been attributed to the increase in commerce and the accompanying growth of intercourse between states. That was an important factor behind the preference for a political effort to develop the principles of international law in a pragmatic manner during the second half of the 19th century. The new emphasis on commerce explains the shift towards the practice of arbitration and adjudication and away from the abstract natural law approach previously taken by the British. 98 That this is still the case today is evidenced by the practice arising from the bilateral investment treaties (BITs). As Zimmermann explains, '[T]he high level of investor protection that they (the BITs) provide is upheld by arbitration'.
Later, the United States also officially took up the flag of arbitration as a tradition of peace and became a firm supporter of international adjudication, starting within its own continent. In fact, the Peace Conference of The Hague of 1907 had been postponed in order that the Third International Conference of the American States could be held at Rio in 1906, at which a resolution was adopted to recommend the negotiation of a general arbitration convention at the conference in The Hague. 100 In the end the conventions agreed in The Hague did not achieve obligatory arbitration. 101 But they succeeded in raising public expectations, and politicians also began to place more weight on this method of securing peace, as a matter both of policy and of practice. Consequently, a great number of arbitration treaties were concluded following the peace conferences. Some of these came in for harsh criticism after the war on account of the fact that they contained open and sweeping reservations of a kind that rendered them practically ineffective. 102 Given the real political difficulties of the times, one must acknowledge that the repeated charge that such treaties were not worth the paper they were written on is only partly deserved. For instance, when it was announced in the summer of 1911 that the American President Taft had signed treaties of compulsory arbitration without reserving vital interests and issues of national honour, the Senate of his country immediately cancelled the whole programme. A genuinely disappointed Taft affirmed that 'this relegates the United States to the rear ranks of those nations which are to help the cause of the universal peace'. 103 fascination for Wilson's personality. They also displayed a degree of cautiousness in their comments, arising from the sense of the dangers involved in a possible AmericanJapanese conflict. In Japan, the American President's idealist pacifism before and during World War I and its sudden transformation into realism in the negotiations of the Peace Treaties were analysed with close attention. For one of those authors, the defeat of Wilsonian idealism was not surprising, 'because such is the fate of any utopianism'.
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Of course, anyone who has read Schücking knows that the picture is not quite as clear-cut as Schlichtmann puts it. The utopian aspect of Schücking's pacifist theory or, simply, international law theory becomes evident in comparison with Kant's project for perpetual peace. To put it briefly, the absence of a philosophical and psychological effort in Schücking's pacifism is what renders it, not idealist, but utopian. This should not be taken to suggest that every international lawyer should be a political philosopher. But Schücking's project was of such ambitious scope as to demand engagement with basic philosophical issues -such as theories of human nature, society, or indeed peace and war. However he did not pursue them, while others -like Kelsen -did. In comparison, the pacifist proponents of international arbitration and adjudication worked with a certain philosophy, surely unsophisticated but nonetheless reflective, in their sociological approach. They usually analysed the questions of peace from the perspective of the average citizen or individual. 'The average individual of these modern days views war with apprehension and alarm'; but the average individual also had passions, greed, common sense, and so on. 106 With respect to Schück-ing, I do not refer to the equally conspicuous absence of a cosmopolitan morality in his project, but rather to his tendency not to recognize that he was addressing human beings; that is to say free individuals who possess inner complexity and depth. The immediate consequence of this utopian aspect is the practical absence of a concept and a theory of the international community based on 'solidarity of interests', which nevertheless entirely underpins his idea of a peaceful political international organization and his theory of international law in general. It is only through short or rhetorical suggestions that we learn of the enormous claim that the function of the principles of internationalism and solidarity of interests is to bring peace, where hitherto the principle of the balance of power had produced war. Or, even less persuasively, he presents the 'solidarity of interests' as a piece of evidence in respect of which no further enquiry is needed, regarding it as necessary merely to find the right international organization 105 Words by journalist Murobuse Takanubo for 'the unquestionably present international community of interest'.
107 His foundational argument of the solidarity of interests presupposes a theory of a community of interests. But to be fair, perhaps it would have been impossible for Schücking, as a pioneer of the emergence of international organization, to have produced such a theory. The lacuna, however, weakens his ideas.
Without attempting to unearth all the historical layers that separate us from Schücking, I would suggest that today we might divide the 'theory of international community of interest' into two. We might seek to formulate a theory of 'international community' and, on the other hand, explore a theory of 'international interests'. This would dispel the myth that an international community must be identical to an international economic community. To research them separately would also facilitate the establishment of a debate between the two theories, which becomes difficult if they are integrated from the outset.
Nonetheless, looking back, we can see that Kant's famous essay analyses peace as between states, not between individuals. But he seeks to complicate the concept of peace through the concept of war. It is through this strategy that he introduced a philosophical notion of human nature in the project for global peace -something that one, as stated above, misses in Schücking. What makes Kant's essay so important as a humanist manifesto is that it tries to demonstrate that 'peace proves to be up to all wars'. 108 To be sure, Kant's depiction of human nature in Zum ewigen Frieden tends to be more Hobbesian than anything else. But again, this is not completely the case because he adds to Hobbes's notion an explicit optimist touch. Although the motive for seeking peace is mainly natural necessity, human reason, which is ultimately freedom, is able to offer an alternative: peace through law.
In respect of the particular point of the interaction between states produced by commerce or 'reciprocal self-interest', Kant grants that it serves as a guarantee to international peace, but hastens to add 'it is not true, precisely from motives of morality'. 109 The spirit of commerce, Kant explains, cannot coexist with war, and that spirit is slowly taking possession of every nation.
Like Kant, Kelsen also produced a complex theory of international peace: one grounded entirely on the notion of war as a sanction. The idea that international law is true law because it can be regarded as a coercive order in which the use of force is a monopoly of the community is based on Kelsen's general theory of law as a coercive instrument.
110 Implicitly, Kelsen builds his entire system of law and peace on a determined notion of human nature. It may be adhered to or not, but certainly it cannot be regarded as that of a utopian theorist of international peace. It is probable that his thesis on the need for war as a collective sanction also derives from a Hobbesian notion of human nature. Why would one individual (or one state), in Hobbes's understanding, obey the law? The answer seems simple: law carries the sword. 111 That Kelsen's conception of war as sanction would create a tension with the pacifist movements is evident. 112 One cannot fail to notice, however, that it is in itself an essential element of Kelsen's pacifist project of a universal law. Moreover, in the pacifist project for the organization of the world that Schücking developed before World War I, he also contemplated an international coercive force. He regarded it as necessary due to the psychological influence it might exert in order to move the countries to obey the decisions of the future international courts of arbitration and adjudication. But in Schücking's pacifist vocabulary coercive force constituted the legal institution of 'execution', not war. One might interpret this turn to force in the Schück-ing's theory as a realist blind spot. After World War I, he retained essentially the same ideas regarding the use of force. Thus in his commentary on the statute of the League of Nations, Article 16 of which contains provisions for coercive measures to be used against the state that started a war -and for military action against violators of peaceSchücking preferred to attribute to those measures the nature of legal execution of the wording of the statute. 113 seemed obvious to him in theory: the need for a far-reaching concept of political organization affecting states in terms of their whole existence and their national and political aims.
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A central element of Kant's proposal is the aim of establishing a universal peace treaty or peace league. 118 A specific peace treaty would only finish a single war, but reason calls for the termination of the state of war altogether. This Kantian league is nevertheless, as Lutz-Bachmann also observes, modest in its aims. 119 These are limited to the maintenance of peace, without requiring that states relinquish their sovereignty (which Kant calls power) or be subjected to overarching public laws. It is probable that what lay behind Kant's argument was not only the historical background of low level interdependence among nations during the time he was writing, and his negative view of human nature, but also the previous experience of the 'miserable comforters', as he called classic international lawyers. 120 Those reasons in support of a league of states, as opposed to a federal world state and world citizenship, might be combined with the positive argument of the high esteem in which he held the democratic constitution of the republic. This is expressed in the first definitive article of the conditions for peace: only a world composed of democratic republics would achieve perpetual peace.
The inauguration of an era of perpetual peace nonetheless called for the formation of a league. Moreover, Kant's comments on the question seem to imply that, in the absence of a peace alliance, international law supported war as a means of pursuing a state's aims. And it is within this Kantian framework of the key role of a league of nations for international peace that one might evaluate Schücking's project. His audacity in interpreting the work done in The Hague as laying the groundwork for a league of states evidences the fact that he was both a political adventurer and a classic. Schücking was advancing the political times when he seized the opportunity provided by concrete international political actions (the meetings of The Hague) for attaining 117 Schücking, supra note 5, at 74. 118 123 Perhaps this omission has to be interpreted as evidence of an ideological affinity with Schücking, which cannot indeed be denied, rather than as lack of consideration.
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Admitting that the term Weltstaatenbund was scarcely politically correct, and following von Liszt, Schücking decided to call the organization in The Hague a union (Staatenverband). However, it was clear to him that 'in reality' we live already in a Weltstaatenbund. 125 Further, he followed the work of German positivist theorists (Paul Laband and Georg Jellinek) on this topic in arguing that the Staatenbund constituted an international law treaty and not a separate entity with independent legal personality. Thus Schücking argued that only if the concept of Staatenbund was understood in the sense proposed by Laband was the organization in The Hague a Weltstaatenbund. This was his way of avoiding the undeniable difficulty in seeking to attribute a diminished level of sovereignty to those states that had participated in the Hague Conferences on the basis of that very participation. It may also have been an attempt to appease the fears of the majority of international lawyers who did not believe, at the beginning of the twentieth century, in a loss of sovereignty of the state. For Schücking the idea was clear: the 'organisation of the Hague was definitively not enough' to impair the sovereignty of its 121 members. 126 As a matter of fact Schücking hardly seemed to be able to keep that many balls in the air.
The question also arises as to what, after all, Schücking's point was when he insisted on the existence of a Weltstaatenbund after The Hague conferences if it did not affect state sovereignty. Taking all these issues into account, one possible argument could be that he wanted to declare the birth of a world organization. No matter how tiny it was at the moment or that its practical political and legal effects appeared nonexistent, the main thing was that the organization was already in place.
Despite the fact that his thesis regarding the confederation (Weltstaatenbund) of The Hague is generally not admitted, 127 one cannot deny that some institutional arrangement occurred at the Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, namely the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Furthermore, Schücking is persuasive in arguing that prior to the League of Nations important work towards international organization had already been done. In affirming this spirit of continuity he concurred with the most prominent figures of the American peace movement, including James Brown Scott, Elihu Root, William Howard Taft, and Andrew Carnegie. 128 But while they stressed the achievements made in relation to international legal arbitration prior to World War I, Schücking for his part -and, one must emphasize, practically alone -did the same, defending the particular pacifist tradition of international organization. To be sure, Schücking was also putting forward his own sense of progressively 'becoming organised', and in that he was beginning with the work done in The Hague. But it was not World War I that inspired him, as seems to be the case of the general narrative of the establishment of the League. 129 Facing the disaster of World War II, and especially the failure of the League of Nations, Kelsen opted in March 1941 -when he gave the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures -for an international court with compulsory jurisdiction. This may be contrasted with an international administration that would be a means to maintain international peace and order. The setting of the lectures -the country where for more than 30 years international lawyers had advocated the establishment of an international court of justice -may have influenced his choice. But certainly he was also trying to follow the more realistic trend of the development of international law.
The ideal of an international court with compulsory jurisdiction for the organization of the post-war world, endowed with an administrative organ capable of enforcing the court's decisions, was a constant theme in Kelsen's writings during the 1930s and 1940s. 130 In many texts Kelsen argued in favour of an international court that would not permit reservations of jurisdiction by states based on the possibility of qualifying the dispute as political. During that period, this argument formed the central core of Kelsen's pacifist theory. 131 The lack of a project with that compulsory jurisdiction would remain one of the reasons for his disillusionment with the United Nations Charter. 132 Kelsen's objective was to achieve a legal world order or Weltrechtsordnung, in a manner analogical to the Welstaatenbund of Schücking. The civitas maxima is for Kelsen that world legal order towards which human consciousness was moving. Kelsen assumed that the history of law was an evolutionary narrative; and he considered factually law's ultimate telos to be total order. Kelsen's main argument is therefore that law is identical with international law. Moreover he regarded any type of global international organization, court, or administrative body as nothing more than a tool for the evolution of the world legal order, which constituted his pacifist project. 
Final Thoughts
The pacifist traditions described in this text contain a wealth of wisdom and knowledge worth revisiting every now and then. They also tell stories of peace and war, often lived through the experiences of their authors. But most significantly these pacifist traditions of international law speak about politics and the involvement of serious intellectuals in political life through their pacifist projects. Walther Schücking occupied a position of considerable importance among them.
Pacifism may seem difficult, paradoxical and often insufficient. But what is clear is that modern international law -international economic law included -cannot be understood without its pacifist traditions. In that respect, one might state that we are all pacifists now.
